A common Misconception about the Categorical Arithmetic by Raguní, Giuseppe
ar
X
iv
:1
60
2.
03
38
9v
1 
 [m
ath
.G
M
]  
13
 Ja
n 2
01
6 A common Misconception about the Categorical
Arithmetic
Giuseppe Raguní
Universidad Católica de Murcia, Spain - graguni@ucam.edu
Abstract
Although the categorical arithmetic is not effectively axiomatizable,
the belief that the incompleteness Theorems can be apply to it is fairly
common. Furthermore, the so-called essential (or inherent) semantic in-
completeness of the second-order Logic that can be deduced by these same
Theorems does not imply the standard semantic incompleteness that can
be derived using the Löwenheim-Skolem or the compactness Theorem.
This state of affairs has its origins in an incorrect and misinterpreted
Gödel’s comment at the Königsberg congress of 1930 and has consoli-
dated due to different circumstances. This paper aims to clear up these
questions and proposes an alternative interpretation for the Gödel’s state-
ment.
Keywords: arithmetic, categoricity, semantic completeness, syntactic
incompleteness, second-order languages.
1 The Categorical Arithmetic
The categorical arithmetic (AR) is a theory where the induction principle is
introduced as a second-order axiom and interpreted according to the standard
semantics. This interpretation, briefly called full (since the predicates range
over the entire power set of the universe of discourse), is necessary for the
categoricity [1].
AR is not a formal theory: it is impossible to dispense with the meaning
of every its formula. This conclusion can be stated as follow. Since the stan-
dard model of AR is infinite and unique under isomorphism, according to the
Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem, this theory cannot be expressed in a semantically
complete language1. Then, it cannot be formal, because every formal theory
has a semantically complete language [3].
1This also can be concluded by noting that, due to the categoricity, the compactness
Theorem (which applies to every theory with a semantically complete language), cannot be
applicable to AR. Here, with a semantically complete language/axiomatic theory we under-
stand a system always interpretable if consistent (that is equivalent to affirm that all the valid
formulas are deducible). That is the usual way, but notice that occasionally others take a
quite different meaning for the same expression (see, e.g. [2]).
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A fortiori, AR is not effectively axiomatizable2, because every effectively
axiomatizable theory is formal.
Since AR is finitely axiomatizable, the last conclusion may surprise. Indeed,
the diffuse opinion that every finite set of exhibited elements always is effectively
enumerable, certainly is true when pure symbols suffice to characterize each one
of the elements. But if we have even one with a meaning, a machine could
identify it only if such meaning is entirely reproducible by mechanical operations
(i.e. eliminable) [4-5]. It is not difficult to realize that in the case of the
full second-order induction axiom this does not occur. Trying to clarify its
meaning by a more precise language, we could resort to that set-theoretical one,
representing AR within the Set Theory. Here, introduced a set for the axioms
of AR, it turns out that the full second-order induction principle is no longer
representable by a single axiom but it is equivalent to an axiomatic scheme
capable of generating an uncountable number of axioms3.
Therefore, against the widespread view, the incompleteness Theorems can-
not be applied to AR. This misconception has dragged on for too long and has
its origins in an incorrect, although absolutely excusable, Gödel’s comment at
the Königsberg congress of 1930.
2 The Gödel’s Statement
According to the editors, the document *1930c in the third volume of the Kurt
Gödel’s collected works (1995), is in all probability the text presented by Gödel
at the Königsberg congress on September 6, 1930 [7]. In the first part of the
document, Gödel presents his semantic completeness Theorem. After he adds
[8]:
[...] If the completeness theorem could also be proved for the
higher parts of logic (the extended functional calculus), then it could
be shown in complete generality that syntactical completeness fol-
lows from monomorphicity [categoricity]; and since we know, for
example, that the Peano axiom system is monomorphic [categori-
cal], from that the solvability of every problem of arithmetic and
analysis expressible in Principia mathematica would follow. Such
an extension of the completeness theorem is, however, impossible,
as I have recently proved [...]. This fact can also be expressed thus:
The Peano axiom system, with the logic of Principia mathematica
added as superstructure, is not syntactically complete.
In summary, Gödel affirms that is impossible to generalize the semantic com-
pleteness Theorem to the “extended functional calculus”. In fact, in this case
also the Peano axiomatic system, structured with the logic of the Principia
2Throughout the paper, we consider as valid the Church-Turing Thesis, so using always
"effectively" rather than "recursively".
3Since one axiom for each element of P(N) is obtained. Of course, this is another proof of
the non-formality of AR [6].
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Mathematica (PM ), would be semantically complete. But since this theory is
categorical, it would follow that it is also syntactically complete. But just this
last thing is false, as he — surprise — announces to have proved.
Now, regardless of what Gödel meant by “extended functional calculus”, this
affirmation contains a mistake. We have in fact two cases:
a) If Gödel understands by “Peano axiomatic system structured with the
logic of the PM ” an any type of formal arithmetic theory, the error is precisely
to regard it as categorical.
b) If rather he alludes to the unique categorical arithmetic, that is AR, then
Gödel errs applying to it his first incompleteness Theorem.
Of the two, just the second belief has been consolidating but without report-
ing the error. Rather, exalting the merit of having detected for the first time
the semantic incompleteness of the (full) second-order Logic.
Probably, to forming this opinion has been important the influence of the
following sentence contained in the second edition (1938) of Grundzüge theo-
retischen der Logik by Hilbert and Ackermann [9]:
Let us remark at once that a complete axiom system for the uni-
versally valid formulas of the predicate calculus of second order does
not exist. Rather, as K. Gödel has shown [K. Gödel, Über formal
unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter
systeme, Mh. Math. Physik Vol. 38 (1931)], for any system of prim-
itive formulas and rules of inference we can find universally valid
formulas which cannot be deduced.
The echo of the Gödel’s incorrect words at the Congress pushes the authors
(in particular Ackermann, given the age of Hilbert) to attest that the first
incompleteness Theorem concludes directly the semantic incompleteness of the
second-order Logic! False. Furthermore, as we will try to show, this (true)
conclusion really does not appear to follow by the incompleteness Theorems.
Even in the introductory note of the aforementioned document, Goldfarb
writes [10]:
Finally, Gödel considers categoricity and syntactic completeness
in the setting of higher-order logics. [...] Noting then that Peano
Arithmetic is categorical — where by Peano Arithmetic he means
the second-order formulation — Gödel infers that if higher-order
logic is [semantically] complete, then there will be a syntactically
complete axiom system for Peano Arithmetic. At this point, he
announces his incompleteness theorem: “The Peano axiom system,
with the logic of Principia mathematica added as superstructure,
is not syntactically complete”. He uses the result to conclude that
there is no (semantically) complete axiom system for higher-order
logic.
So interpreting, without the slightest doubt, that Gödel refers to the second-
order categorical arithmetic.
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Indeed, today the belief that the incompleteness Theorems can also apply to
AR and, above all, that they have as a corollary the semantic incompleteness of
the second-order Logic is widespread. Nevertheless, it is very rare that someone
infers the semantic incompleteness of the (full) second-order Logic in the easy
and direct way that — according to the b. interpretation — Gödel would fol-
low, i.e. passing by the (alleged) syntactic incompleteness of AR. Almost all the
authors follow the alternative to prove that the valid formulas of AR cannot be
effectively enumerable (see e.g. [11] and [12]): by contradiction, also the true (in
the standard model) sentences of the formal (first-order) arithmetic would be
effectively enumerable, against the first incompleteness Theorem. That is not
only more complex but also quite different: the genuine semantic completeness
of a system, simply requires that all the valid formulas are theorems, not nec-
essarily effectively enumerable theorems4. Actually, the intrinsic non-formality
of AR entails that it really makes use of a non-effective deductive method. So,
these proofs really do not conclude the (genuine) semantic incompleteness of
the second-order Logic (as, on the contrary, the use of the Löwenheim-Skolem
Theorem or compactness Theorem can do).
The only explanation of this approach is that the authors are not sure about
the direct applicability of the first incompleteness Theorem to AR. That is not
at all surprising in view of the evidences shown in the previous section; but
nothing more is said.
Too respect for the stature of Godel may have affected this state of affairs,
but the main reasons of this misunderstanding are due probably to ambiguities
of the used terminology, both ancient and modern.
3 Clearing up the Terms
The expression “extended predicate calculus” is for the first time used by Hilbert
in the first edition (1928) of the aforementioned Grundzüge der theoretischen
Logik where, with no doubt, indicates the full second-order Logic, which was
considered for the first time in the Principia Mathematica. The belief that
Gödel, in the aforementioned phrase, refers to the AR theory (explanation b.),
implies that he, with “extended functional calculus”, intends the same thing.
But in which work he has shown or at least suggested that the incompleteness
Theorems can apply to the full second-order Logic? In none.
In his proof of 1931, Gödel refers to a formal system with a language that, in
addition to the first-order classical logic, allows the use of non-bound functional
variables [14]. Then he proves that this is not a real extension of the language,
able, in particular, to hinder the applicability of the semantic completeness
Theorem.
In the 1932b publication, Gödel declares the validity of the incompleteness
Theorems for a formal system (Z ), based on first-order logic, with the axioms
4This type of semantic incompleteness is called sometimes essential [13] or inherent [12],
but these adjectives are not very appropriate because it does not imply the (standard) semantic
incompleteness.
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of Peano and an induction principle defined by a recursive function. Certainly
not a full induction. He adds [15]:
If we imagine that the system Z is successively enlarged by the
introduction of variables for classes of numbers, classes of classes of
numbers, and so forth, together with the corresponding comprehen-
sion axioms, we obtain a sequence (continuable into the transfinite)
of formal systems that satisfy the assumptions mentioned above [...]
Speaking explicitly of comprehension axioms, able to limit to the countable the
number of the sentences, and formal systems.
Finally, in the publication of 1934, which contains the last and definitive
proof of the first incompleteness Theorem, Gödel, having the aim both to gen-
eralize and to simplify the proof, allows the quantification either on the func-
tional or propositional variables: a declared type of second-order. However,
appropriate comprehension axioms limit again to infinite countable the number
of sentences [16]. Gödel never misses an opportunity to point out carefully that
always is referring to a formal system and that the formulas are enumerable
[17]:
Different formal systems are determined according to how many
of these types of variables are used. We shall restrict ourselves to the
first two types; that is, we shall use variables of the three sorts p, q,
r,... [propositional variables]; x, y, z,... [natural numbers variables];
f, g, h, ... [functional variables]. We assume that a denumerably infi-
nite number of each are included among the undefined terms (as may
be secured, for example, by the use of letters with numerical sub-
scripts). [...] For undefined terms (hence the formulas and proofs)
are countable, and hence a representation of the system by a system
of positive integers can be constructed, as we shall now do.
Therefore, certainly we are not in the full second-order. Nevertheless, in the
introduction to the same paper, Kleene, in summarizing the work of Gödel, does
not avoid commenting ambiguously [18]:
Quantified propositional variables are eliminable in favor of func-
tion quantifiers. Thus the whole system is a form of full second-order
arithmetic (now frequently called the system of “analysis”).
But he could only mean that the whole system is a formal version (perhaps as
large as possible) of the full second-order arithmetic. Maybe is exactly this one
the “extended functional calculus” to which Gödel was referring in the examined
words at the Congress? We will discuss it in the next section.
Another source of mistake is probably related to use of the term metamath-
ematics. Although Gödel intends it in the modern broad sense that includes
any kind of argument beyond to the coded formal language of Mathematics, in
his theorems always he employs this term limiting it to a formalizable (though
often not yet formalized) use deductive (and, indeed, even decidable): therefore,
only with purpose of brevity.
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In the short paper that anticipates his incompleteness Theorems, for exam-
ple, Gödel invokes a metamathematics able to decide whether a formula is an
axiom or not [19]:
[...] IV. Theorem I [first incompleteness Theorem] still holds for
all ω-consistent extensions of the system S that are obtained by the
addition of infinitely many axioms, provided the added class of ax-
ioms is decidable, that is, provided for every formula it is metamath-
ematically decidable whether it is an axiom or not (here again we
suppose that in metamathematics we have at our disposal the logical
devices of PM). Theorems I, III [as the IV, but the added axioms
are finite], and IV can be extended also to other formal systems,
for example, to the Zermelo-Fraenkel axiom system of set theory,
provided the systems in question are ω-consistent.
But in both the subsequent rigorous proofs, he will formalize this process, which
now is called metamathematical, using the recursive functions, so revealing that,
in the words just quoted, he refers to the usual “mechanical” decidability. By the
same token, even in the theorem that concludes the consistency of the axiom of
choice and of the continuum hypothesis with the other axioms of the formal Set
Theory, he does the same: he uses the metamathematics only as a simplification,
stating explicitly that all “the proofs could be formalized” and that “the general
metamathematical considerations could be left out entirely” [20].
4 An Alternative Explanation
As noted, Gödel has never put in writing that his proofs of incompleteness may
be applied to the uncountable full second-order arithmetic and it looks abso-
lutely not reasonable to believe that he deems it5. In this section, therefore,
we will examine the other possibility, namely the a. of the second section. It
pretends that Godel in 1930 believed, mistakenly, categorical a kind of formal
arithmetic and, in consequence of his incompleteness Theorems, semantically in-
complete its language. Is this reasonable (or more reasonable than the previous
case)?
Certainly not for the system considered by Gödel in his first proof of 1931: in
fact, the semantic completeness Theorem applies to it, as Gödel himself remarks
in note n. 55 of the publication [23]. Indeed, this is the first time in which the
existence of non-standard models for a formal arithmetic is proved: why Gödel
does not report it? The topic deserves a brief analysis.
More generally than the use of the incompleteness Theorems, the existence
of non-standard models for any formal arithmetic theory can be proved using the
compactness Theorem, the upward Löwenheim-Skolem one or a theorem proved
5I myself have changed my opinion reported in [21] and [22] after a deeper analysis of the
Kurt Gödel’s collected works.
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by Skolem in 19336. The compactness Theorem is due precisely to Gödel (1930)
and derives from his semantic completeness Theorem; but in none of his works
Gödel ever uses it7. Moreover, despite its fundamental importance for the model
theory, nobody — except Maltsev in 1936 and 1941 — uses it before 19458.
Not much more fortunate is the story of the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem.
The first proof, by Löwenheim (1915), will be simplified by Skolem in 19209. In
both cases, these theorems are downward versions, able to conclude the non-
categoricity of the formal theory of the real numbers and of the formal Set
Theory, but not of the formal Peano arithmetic. However, Skolem and Von
Neumann suspect a much more general validity of the result [29]. It seems
that also Tarski was interested to this argument at that time, probably getting
the upward version of the Theorem in a seminar of 192810. In any case, the
argument continues to have low popularity11, at least until the generalization
of Maltsev in 1936 [30], which, including for the first time the upward version,
will allow the general conclusion that all the theories equipped with an infinite
model and a semantically complete language are not categorical.
In this context of disinterest for the topic, Gödel not only is no exception,
but his notorious Platonist inclination pushes him to distrust and/or despise any
interpretation that refers to objects foreign to those that he believes existing
independently of the considered theory; which, in all plausibility, also believes
unique. As a matter of fact, in the introduction of his first paper on the semantic
completeness, he shows to believe categorical even the first-order formal theory
of the real numbers [32].
On this basis, one can surmise the following alternative for the option a.
When he discovers the non-categoricity of the formal arithmetical system where
his original incompleteness Theorems are applied, Gödel is not so glad and
immediately looks for an extension that, though formal, is able to ensure the
categoricity. Probably he believes to have identified it in a formal version of the
full second order arithmetic: just that one that will be considered in his general-
ized proof of the first incompleteness Theorem of 1934 [33], where quantification
on the functional and propositional variables are allowed, while the formality is
respected. This hypothesis is consistent with the fact that Gödel could admit
the possibility that this theory uses a semantically incomplete language, because
in both the versions of his semantic completeness Theorem, he does not allow
the use of quantifiers on functional variables [34]. Just the planning of this
generalization (literally extended to the functional calculus) pushes him, in the
meantime, to communicate the result without mentioning the discovery of the
non-standard models. For example, just after his famous announcement at the
6 That resolves that the system of the formal (first-order) sentences that are true in the
standard model is non-categorical [24].
7This is confirmed by Feferman [25]
8This is attested both by Vaught and Fenstad in [26] and [27].
9The respective works, relative to the first-order classical Logic (instead of the semantic
completeness), are in [28].
10This information is due to Maltsev: in [30] he claims to have known it by Skolem.
11It is significant, for example, that Hilbert did not mention this theme in the seminary of
Hamburg in 1927 [31].
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Congress of Königsberg on September 6, 1930, Gödel declares [35]:
(Assuming the consistency of classical mathematics) one can even
give examples of propositions (and in fact of those of the type of
Goldbach or Fermat) that, while contentually true, are unprovable
in the formal system of classical mathematics. Therefore, if one ad-
joins the negation of such a proposition to the axioms of classical
mathematics, one obtains a consistent system in which a contentu-
ally false proposition is provable.
Indubitably here, admitted the soundness, he has in mind a formal theory that,
being syntactically incomplete and categorical, has a semantically incomplete
language.
The first surprise comes to him with the Skolem’s proof of 1933: neither the
system of the formal (first-order) sentences that are true in the standard model
is categorical [24]. A first disturbing clue that the non-categoricity covers all
the formal (with at least an infinite model) systems, regardless of the syntactic
completeness or incompleteness. Gödel, in reviewing the Skolem’s paper, la-
conically observes — finally! — that a consequence of this result, that is the
non-categoricity of the formal Peano arithmetic, was already derivable from his
incompleteness Theorems [36]. Later, in any work (not only in the cited gen-
eralization of 1934), he always will ignore the issue of the categoricity, nor ever
will return to state that by his incompleteness Theorems can be derived the
semantic incompleteness of some language or theory.
Ultimately, the Henkin’s Theorem of 1950 [3] will prove that in every formal
system (and so, anywhere the incompleteness Theorems could be applied) there
is semantic completeness of the language and therefore, if at least an infinite
model exists, there cannot be categoricity.
5 Conclusions
Since the categorical arithmetic is not effectively axiomatizable and any type of
formal arithmetic is not categorical, the text of the Gödel’s communication at
the conference in Königsberg on September 6, 1930 (never published by him)
contains a mistake. In the common understanding this error is not reported
and thus it is wrongly believed that: a) the incompleteness Theorems also can
be applied to the categorical arithmetic; b) the semantic incompleteness of the
second-order Logic is a consequence of the incompleteness Theorems.
The previous interpretation is untenable, nor supported by the Gödel’s pub-
lications. As a matter of fact, the semantic incompleteness of the second-order
Logic is due to the fact that this language allows to get the categoricity of
theories (not only AR) equipped with at least an infinite model. And this is
independent of the syntactic incompleteness of the formal arithmetic. By the
incompleteness Theorems it is only possible to derive the so-called essential (or
inherent) semantic incompleteness of the second-order Logic, which however
does not imply the standard semantic incompleteness.
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As an alternative interpretation of the manuscript in question, it is very
plausible that Gödel was referring to a formal arithmetic (later specified in his
proof of 1934) in which the quantification on the functional and propositional
variables is allowed. If so, in 1930 he believed that this theory was categorical
and, as a consequence of its syntactic incompleteness, equipped with a seman-
tically incomplete language. This explanation is consistent with the fact that
both the version of his semantic completeness Theorem cannot be applied to
this system, due to the said quantification.
We wish to emphasize that this alternative in no way shades the luster
of Gödel, because it makes no sense to pretend that he, in 1930, could know
that every formal system, equipped with at least one infinite model, is not
categorical. Conversely, it absolves him from a blunder and also explains why,
becoming more and more evident, as time passes, the difficulty for the condition
of categoricity, he never will repeat alike affirmations. On the other hand,
Gödel never corrected the phrase presumably because he was not worrying about
rectifying an unpublished text.
Finally, about the possible syntactic (and, by the categoricity, also semantic)
completeness of the categorical arithmetic, we just observe that it would not
be incompatible with the fact that the language of this theory is semantically
incomplete. In fact, although an axiomatic system that uses a semantically
complete language always is semantically complete, the reverse is not always
true [37].
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